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Notes on Formal Constructivism 
D. Joyner and P Lejarraga 
Dept. Mathematics 
U.S. Naval Academy 
Annapolis, MD 
ABSTRACT 
Our aim is to sketch some ideas related to how we (as in, 
we two) think we (as in, we humans) think. 
"That theory is useless. It isn't even wrong." 
- Wolfgang Pauli. 
Our hope in this paper is to provide a theory, admit-
tedly somewhat vague, of how we think about math-
ematics. We also hope our ideas do not cause the 
reader to be reminded of Pauli's quote above. 
These notes were motivated by the interesting book 
by Changeaux and Connes [CC]. 
REALISM VS CONSTRUCTIVISM 
Realism: Mathematical objects exist independently of 
experience (or "physical reality") which we process 
using our senses (smell, touch, sight, ... ) and interpret 
using our brain. For example, Descartes speaks of a 
triangle as an "immutable and eternal" figure whose 
existence is independent of the mind which imagines 
it. Similar statements are made regarding God by 
many religious experts. 
Constructivism: Mathematical objects exist solely in 
the mind as a certain electro-chemo-biological pattern 
of neurons, synapses, chemicals, ... in the brain. For 
an extreme example, Hume believed that ideas are 
merely copies of sense impressions. 
Examples: Alain Cannes (and probably most math-
ematicians) are realists. For example, the famous quote 
of Kronecker's, "The integers are made by God, all 
else is made by man," indicates a realist point-of-view. 
On the other hand, the biologist Jean Pierre Changeux 
and philosopher David Hume are constructivists 
(though Hume is the more extreme). Poincare was 
possibly a constructivist in this sense (see [D], chap-
ter 9). 
The realist position might be roughly summarized as 
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follows: The physical world is modeled as much as 
possible by mathematics. Mathematicians merely dis-
cover what is already in existence. 
The constructivist position might be summarized as 
follows: Models for the physical world are construc-
tions of the mind (only) and all such mental constructs 
exist solely as electro-chemo-biological patterns of 
neurons, ... in the brain. To the question, "Why is math-
ematics so well-suited to the description of physics?", 
the constructivist might counter that physicists tend 
to examine reproducible phenomena which tend to 
have "universal" characteristics. Hence mathematics, 
which is also universal, is admirably suited for physi-
cal description. 
POINTS OF AGREEMENT 
• Mathematics provides a "universal language", i.e., 
a grammar and set of terms which can be under-
stood by anyone (sufficiently trained), indepen-
dently of their cultural background. 
• There is a "physical world" independent of our 
mind (which, however, we sense using our brain 
and sensory organs). 
• Mathematical objects can be represented as a cer-
tain electro-chemo-biological pattern of neurons, 
synapses, chemicals, ... in the brain. 
• A given mathematical construction can be repre-
sented as a program in a "Turing machine". 
(Using an over-simplification, these representa-
tions are modeled using neural networks, which 
are related to Turing machines [M].) 
FORMAL CONSTRUCTIVISM 
AssoRTED THOUGHTS OF OuR OwN 
• Though mathematics may indeed be universal, its 
development and current state is inspired and in-
fluenced by culture and the human experience. 





There may be experiences outside the human 
realm (the realm includes other methods of detec-
tion, such as computers, microscopes, cyclotrons, 
... ) which might lead to mathematics which we 
humans might never "discover/invent/realize". 
The brain is capable of translating (or "produc-
ing") from sensual patterns certain "grammar" (or, 
loosely speaking, patterns of patterns). These may 
be thought of as rules that mental objects satisfy, 
though they are more intuitive feelings than rig-
orous laws. (For example, one never expects to see 
a mouse tum into an elephant, so such a concat-
enation of mental objects in our senses would be 
regarded as ungrammatical.) 
The brain is capable of translating certain univer-
sal mental objects into symbolic objects (such as 
translating sounds into written words). Grammar 
satisfied by the mental objects can be translated 
into grammar for the symbols. 
Suppose that we do indeed perceive "reality" via 
our brain and senses. Suppose, in the extreme, that 
all mental objects are merely copies of sense im-
pressions. ("Copy" is being loosely interpreted 
here, as it is assumed that a sense impression is an 
electro-chemo-biological pattern in the brain and 
the brain may be less reliable than a camera or 
xerox machine!) These objects may possess prop-
erties (at least as far as we may sense them). As-
sume that we may posulate (using our imagina-
tion) new properties for these objects. Define a 
~'model" to be a logically coherent collection of 
objects and their properties. It seems reasonable 
. to hypothesize that all of mathematics belongs to 
some such model. 
If these assumptions are accepted, one may then 
create a sort of "platonic model" of mathematics, 
even though the actual objects may exist only as 
mental constructs (this idea which you have just 
read about may be such a "model"!). Call this for-
mal constructivism. 
In formal constructivism the mind-body dualism 
problem might be regarded as follows. The mind 
is merely a collection of mental objects, construc-
tions and models. The body is a collection of 
nerves, bones, synapses, .... Constructive realism 
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defines the model to be a collection of electro-
chemo-biological patterns in the brain. Thus the 
"mind" is part of the functioning of the "body" 
and hence there is no dualism. 
• If the "realm of human experience~' consists of all 
human ideas, experiences, and activities, then 
within this realm statements may be divided into 
two classes, T (testable) and NT (non-testable): 
(T) Those statements regarding experiences which 
are in principle testable by some physical de-
vice or thought experiment. We assume that 
the thought experiment is one which tests the 
truth or falsity of a well-defined statement 
within an axiomatically presented (logical, 
mathematical or philosophical, for example) 
internally consistent universal model. In this 
case the validity of the test would, of course, 
only be relative to the axioms assumed. For 
example, "The person reading this sentence is 
a human being," is both testable and probably 
true! 
(NT) Those statements regarding experiences 
which are not testable in the sense above. For 
example, "Triangles existed 2 billion years 
ago," is not testable. 
All statements in the second class cannot be know-
able in the sense that they can be tested. However, 
depending on one's axioms, many models are test-
able. For example, if one hypothesizes the exist-
ence of God in a consistent model, then of course 
the statement, "God exists," is axiomatically true. 
A mathematical analogy of this testable/non-testable 
idea: mathematical statements may be divided into 
two classes, D (decidable) and UD (undecidable): ' · 
(D) Those statements which may be proven true or 
false logically from the axioms of some mathemati-
cal model with a recursive set of axioms (say 
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory). 
(UD) Those statements which cannot be proven true 
or false logically from the axioms of some math-
ematical model with a finite set of axioms. Such 
statements could be: 
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-known to be true (but "self-referential" and not cessing even more information. 
provable, as in Godel's incompleteness theorem), 
The point is that the way we think about mathemat-
- known to be false (but not disprovable), ics falls into one of several categories. We either 
-poorly formed (using the grammar of the model), 
- well-formed but independent of the axioms 
(such as the Continuum Hypothesis). 
LANGUAGE AND GRAMMAR 
So far, we have simply regarded the brain as a pro-
cessing unit, which is capable of translating (or pro-
ducing) certain patterns from sequences of mental 
objects. These patterns may be translated and repre-
sented (not necessarily faithfully) using more univer-
sal mental objects. Call these objects "symbols". This 
capability of the brain might be regarded as an "ab-
straction device": a machine which is capable of no-
ticing patterns from sequences of inputs. Of course, 
some patterns are more relevant than others. The brain 
is also capable of distingishing, evaluating, and se-
lecting patterns. 
The brain also has a tendency towards using univer-
sal mental objects (constructing order from chaos, if 
you will). Therefore, it is natural for the brain to pro-
cess stimuli in terms of symbols and grammar. This 
leads naturally to language, which is useful for pro-
• formally manipulate symbols (such as algebraic 
expressions), following grammatical rules, 
• formally manipulate mathematical objects (such 
as knots), following grammatical rules, 
• experimentally determine grammatical rules us-
ing sequences of mathematical objects, 
• select mathematical objects from sequences using 
some evaluation procedure (possibly for the pur-
pose of manipulating them or determining gram-
matical rules for them). 
All these involve one of the brain's capabilities dis-
cussed above. 
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Calculus 
I tell my students the story 
of Newton versus Leibniz, 
the war of symbols, 
lasting five generations, 
between The Continent 
and British Isles, 
involving deeply hurt 
sensibilities, grievous 
blows to national pride; 
on such weighty issues 
as publication priority 
and working systems 
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of logical notation: 
whether the derivative 
must be denoted by a "prime", 
an apostrophe atop 
the right hand corner 
of a function, evaluated 
by Newton's fluxions method 
or by a formal quotient 
of differentials dy I dx, 
intimating future possibilities, 
terminology that guides 
the mind. 
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